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The connection between average sectoral income, occupational choice and structural 
change has so far only been described vaguely for sectors dominated by small 
enterprises. Taking agriculture as an example, we first develop a theoretical model in 
which we explain the decision to take over a farm with the average agricultural 
household income in the past years and the number of farms with the patterns of 
occupational choice. We then estimate a regression in which we explain occupational 
choices by the sectoral income situation and rate of farm decline by earlier 
occupational choices. The results demonstrate that a good income situation increases 
the number of occupational choices in favour for farming, and that occupational 
choices for farming in turn slow down the decline in farm numbers. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
More and more attention of agricultural economists has been devoted to the decline in 
numbers of farms in the western hemisphere, an important part of what is called structural 
change in agriculture. The analytical approaches to structural change can be divided into 
empirical studies in which the patterns of farm decline were traced back to different 
independent variables and papers that tried to develop a theoretical understanding of 
structural change. 
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Among the latter group, two theoretical approaches have found particular attention among 
agricultural economists. Schmitt (1991) argues that family farms as a form of organisation 
have persisted in advanced societies because they allow for a flexible combination of on-
farm and off-farm earnings (as recently confirmed by Lee, 1998, and by Ahituv and Kimhi, 
2002). He emphasises the importance of transaction costs which, as he recognises, increase 
with growing farm size. Balmann (1997), on the other hand, dismisses the idea of the 
structure of small family farms being efficient and states path dependencies and sunk costs 
as a reason that efficient farm structures could not develop in the western world. 
As conflicting as these two theories are (Beckmann et al., 1994), they both neglect the fact 
that, for every generation, the persistence of each farm is inextricably connected with the 
decision of an individual to become a farmer. This paper makes the point that, in order to 
understand the patterns of structural change, one has to understand the patterns of 
occupational choice. 
The connection between occupational choice and structural change in agriculture has been 
described in some form or other (Gale, 1993; 2003; Fasterding, 2002), but the character and 
the scale of this connection has never been elaborated on in detail. Furthermore, outside of 
agriculture the connection between occupational choice and structural change is only partly 
understood. Rather, the causal relationship is usually perceived to be inverse. Structural 
change is mostly seen as the independent variable that influences the labour market and 
eventually occupational choices (Champlin, 1995; Greenhalgh and Gregory, 2001; 
Sabirianova, 2002). Only gradually is it understood that, in turn, the pattern of occupational 
choices in a society influences also the economic structure (Nahuis and Smulders, 2002). 
Section 2 is devoted to current empirical findings on the determinants of structural change. A 
model is then developed in Section 3 in order to visualise the dependencies between 
occupational choice and structural change in agriculture. In Section 4, the model is tested for 
its empirical relevance, by own results as well as by other research work. Section 5 
discusses the  implications of the findings for policy. 
 
2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
The last decade has seen vast progress in the quality of understanding structural change in 
agriculture. Primarily, this progress can be attributed to a series of regressions that explain 
the change in the number of farms by different means. These models which are summarised 
in Table 1, can be divided into three groups:   4
Weiss (1999), Baur (1999) and Hofer (2002) look at single farms and carry out logit-analyses 
in order to determine factors responsible for farm survival and farm abandonment. They are 
best able to capture the significance of personal characteristics such as the farmer’s age and 
education. 
A second group of economists chooses a meso-level, explaining the development of number 
of farms within a community (Rösti, 1997), a state (Huffman and Evanson, 2001) or a group 
of farms with similar size and location (Mann, 2003). By doing so, they link the influence of 
individual factors to the significance of the macro-environment. 
Hofreither and Weiss (1993) as well as Schmitt and Andermann (1996 a,b) are primarily 
concerned with the macroeconomic factors influencing the development of farm numbers 
and size, by using the number of farms in a country as the dependent variable. 
Table 1: Variables influencing structural change in agriculture 
 Farmer’s 
Age 








Weiss (1999)  √  √  √ n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Baur (1999)  √  √  √ n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Hofer (2002)  √  √  √  √ n.a.  n.a. 
             
Rösti (1997)  n.a.  √ n.a. √ -  n.a. 
Huffman and 
Evanson (2001)  n.a. n.a.  √  √  √  √ 
Mann (2003)  √  √ n.a. √ - - 
             
Hofreither and 








√  n.a. n.a. n.a.  √ n.a. 
√  influence significant on a 95 % level 
-  Significant influence could not be proven 
n.a.  factor was not tested  
If Table 1 shows that some factors have been proven as significant by some of the authors 
and as non-significant by others, this is no grave contradiction but can be attributed to the 
different time frames and locations of the studies. Overall, however, the studies reveal a 
coherent picture. Most factors that are shown to influence structural change can well be 
explained by economic theory and show that rational factors are at least partly responsible   5
for structural change. To start with the macroeconomic argument, higher costs for factors like 
labour ceteris paribus diminish farm profitability and drive a larger share of farms out of 
business. On the other hand, agricultural policy measures that keep food prices up and 
transfer direct payments to farm households tend to conserve the farm structure.  In addition, 
Schmitt and Andermann (1996a) prove the significant influence of the terms of trade as a 
whole for structural change. The way out of farming seems to be easier for part-time than for 
full-time farmers. And the Table shows clearly that the economies of scale lead to the well-
known fact that large farms are more likely to persist than small farms. 
All authors who included the age variable found that the farmer’s age was highly significant in 
influencing the likelihood of a farm to persist. This leads to the assumption that a farm will 
most probably be given up after the farmer approaches retirement age. It may sound trivial, 
but the notion that on the other hand closing a farm with the farmer aged, say, 40 years  is 
quite unlikely, has not been given sufficient attention in the debate on structural 
development. 
Our assumption of a farm rarely being abandoned during the work life of the farmer is 
confirmed by evidence from studies about farm transfer. Normative studies on the optimal 
timing of farm transfer mainly show a strong dependency from soft factors like the children’s 
respect or the degree of altruism (Kimhi, 1994; Miljkovic, 2000). The empirical literature is 
more conclusive: Stiglbauer and Weiss (1999) analyse the family farm life cycle and find that 
the share of Upper Austrian farmers abandoning their farm during the phase of  activity is 
below ten per cent. In a study on farm succession in Switzerland (Burnier et al., 1980), the 
median age of retiring farmers lies at 59 years, the median age of entering farmers at 31 
years. And in a study of abandoned farms in Germany (Strohm, 1998), only two out of 38 full-
time farmers that went out of business were younger than 53 years. And Potter and Lobley 
(1996) show that in the years before retirement, the behaviour of the farmer largely depends 
on the existence of a successor. 
This means that the point of intra-family or even inter-family succession is a critical one for 
structural change and it is worthwhile to take a closer look  at what are the decision patterns 
for or against taking over a farm. A limited number of studies on farm succession point to the 
importance of personal preferences (Koch-Achelpöhler, 1998), but also to rational behaviour: 
Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) and Fasterding (1999) show by surveys that large and profitable 
farms are more likely to find a successor than small farms. And Pietola et al. (2003) show the 
significance of policy support in the decision of potential successors to enter farming. 
In the following section, these findings are developed from a mere description into a 
theoretical model of structural change for family-farm based agricultural systems.   6
3. THE MODEL 
3.1 Occupational choice 
Let us first focus on determinants of the personal decision to take over a farm. In line with  
the model of Rosen (1986), we assume two kinds of jobs to chose between. 
uia=wia+ni  (1) 
uib=wib+nib  (2) 
The agricultural job (set equal with taking over a farm) a and the non-agricultural job b; both 
have two utility components, a monetary welfare measure w that mirrors the amount of 
money as earned income and a non-monetary utility component n. The non-monetary utility 
components of farming have been described extensively (Bahner, 1995). Stating the reason 
for becoming a farmer, in most surveys autonomy comes first, followed by a preference for 
working with nature and animals (Bundesamt für Landwirtschaft, 2001). The non-monetary 
benefits of non-agricultural occupations will differ from case to case. In the public service of 
most countries, for example, job security will play a role. 
It is reasonable, as Gale (1993) does, to assume that potential farm successors are only a 
finite number of people M. For this model, M may , for example, be assumed to consist of 
farmers’ children. The fact that this is the most common group to choose a farm career  is 
explained by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) for the farm sector and by Bjuggren and Sund 
(2002) in general. A broader definition of M would include every school graduate who would 
prefer to work outdoors, as 14 per cent of German school graduates claimed in a survey 
(Kanowski, 2002). 
The decisive factors in M’s occupational choice are now the differentials, rather in expected 
wage wie than in real wage between agricultural (a) and non-agricultural (b) occupations 
∆wie= wiae - wibe  (3) 
and in expected non-monetary utility components 
∆nie= niae - nibe,  (4) 
so that it is possible to work out  the expected difference in utility ∆uie between the two 
occupational choices 
∆uie= ∆wie + ∆nie  (5) 
as a result.   7
Graduates will only choose to enter farming (D=1) if that is what maximises their expected 
utility. Otherwise, they will choose the non-agricultural occupation D=0. Consequently, 
choices are wholly covered by the rule: 
Choose D=1 or D=0 as ∆uie≷0 
Ties (∆uie=0) are broken by random device, such as flipping a coin. 
Given the size of M choosing between D=1 and D=0, relative market supply conditions are 
completely characterised by calculating the number for whom ∆uie>0 and calculating the 
number for whom ∆uie<0. It is convenient to describe differences in preferences among M 
parametrically for analysis. Define g(∆uie) as the density (in the sense of a probability density 
function) of expectations in the population of M making choices and define G(uie) as the 













Fig. 1 illustrates eqs. (6) and (7) for a given distribution of ∆uie. Relative supply to D=1 farm 
successors is the area under g(∆uie) to the right of 0 – this is eq. (6). Relative supply to D=0 
is the area to the left of 0 – this is eq. (7). E shows the conditional expectations for the whole 
group of M as well as for M0
s and M1
s. 
Finally, the share s of M that engages in farming is defined as  
s=M1
s/M.  (8) 
Our theoretical considerations in this model lead to the first hypothesis that the expected 
difference in utility between an agricultural career and a non-agricultural career influences 
the decision between farm succession and an alternative career. 
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E(∆uie)
Individuals 
out of M who 
choose D=O
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2.2 Structural change 
In order to draw clear conclusions from the patterns of occupational choices to the patterns 
of structural change, it is convenient to come up with two additional simplifying assumptions. 
The first assumption is that the period of being the farmer in charge on a farm is given as t 
years and does not vary over time. t is assumed to be identical for all farmers. The second 
assumption is that no exit of the farm household is possible before year t once the decision 
to take-over (D=1) has been made. Both assumptions do largely match the empirical results 
for family farming, particularly full-time family farms, that will be presented in Section 4. The 
second assumption can theoretically be explained by the prohibitive level of sunk costs 
because of investments in education and experience  that cannot be regained when leaving 
the farm (Hirshman, 1970; Sutton, 1992). 





 (sj*Mj), (9) 
in which j=1 describes the past year, j=t the year after which farmers are going to retire. The 
rate of structural change in agriculture is on the whole primarily described by the annual rate 
of variation in farm numbers ∆F/F. This rate can be quantified as   9






* , (10) 
  whereas j=0 describes the current year.  
That leaves two causes for structural change. The first is that M0≠Mt, i.e. that the number of 
persons eligible for taking over a farm has changed over the years. Consider farm 
successors as constituting M. A past decline in the number of farms then decreases M0 
compared to Mt. That makes structural change  a self-accelerating process. For a broader 
definition of M, the demographic decline in the birth rate that was experienced in most of the 
industrialised world led to M0<Mt. Structural change in agriculture should therefore be 
considered in the context of past sociodemographic trends. 
The second constituting component for structural change is the size of s. It is therefore 













*  (11) 
For the current situation, the distribution of the once expected utility of retiring farmers may 
be assumed as given. t is also assumed as a constant. Fig. 2 therefore illustrates the rate of 
structural change as a function of E(∆uie) in year j=0. It shows how rational expectations 
connected with an agricultural career, weighed against rational expectations connected with 
a non-agricultural career, influence structural change. To give an extreme example: Imagine 
that the expected utility of farming in the current year is so low that nobody enters farming. 
Under the assumptions of the model, the maximum rate of farm decline would be restricted 
to 






*  (12) 
Equation 12 may be visualised with help of figures. Given that farmers have a period of being 
in charge at a farm for t=30 years, and given that, in past years, the exits from and entrants 
in farming have been constant from year to year, the maximum decline in farm numbers in 
the current year would be 3.3 per cent. 
Point A at Fig. 2 depicts a situation in which s0*M0=st*Mt, where the number of entries equals 
the number of exits t years ago, so that the annual rate of structural change is zero. Point B 
mirrors a situation that is more typical for western societies. The expected utility of taking 
over a farm is low, thus  not all farms do find an successor. This leads to a decline in the 
number of farms. Point C shows the opposite situation that is typical for some developing 































*   
g B‘
expected opportunity costs of farming are so low that the number of entrants exceeds the 
number of exiting farmers, therefore  the number of farms increases and the size of the 
average holding decreases. 









As  was described in the last section and can be confirmed by browsing through general 
occupational choice literature (Easterlin, 1995; Clemens, 2002), it is widely held that 
exogenous changes influence occupational choices. The impact of economic changes on 
structural change can therefore be seen  as an indirect connection. Figure 2 shows a 
situation in which agricultural policy conditions change in a favourable way, be it through   
introduction of direct payments or through  an administered increase in food prices. This 
increases the mean of ∆uie, so that B is shifted towards B’. However, an increase in 
opportunity costs, for example through an increase in non-agricultural wages or a reduction 
of unemployment, may again decrease ∆uie and shift the equilibrium back to B. Thus, the 
speed of negative structural change increases again, as fewer graduates choose a farming 
career. 
It depends on the stability of the amount of farmland in a country whether any extensions of 
this theory towards farm size can be drawn. However, in most industrialised countries, the 
amount of land under cultivation has remained fairly stable during past decades. If we 
therefore assume the farm area as a constant L, average farm size S in period t is simply 




 (sj*Mj) (13) 
and the annual relative change in average farm size is   11















 (sj*Mj) (14) 
This indicates a reciprocal relationship between F and L, i.e. a decline in the number of farms 
necessarily implies a growing farm size. As the development of farm numbers has been 
shown to be dependent from demographic factors and expected utility from farming, so is 
farm size. This challenges earlier approaches who saw economies of scale (Gardner and 
Pope, 1978) or factor prices (Kislev and Peterson, 1982) as the main determinants of farm 
size. 
These theoretical considerations lead to the second hypothesis that the number of persons 
who choose a farming career influences the speed of structural change in agriculture 
(defined as the development of the number of farms and the connected growth in farm size). 
 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
If the model developed in Section 3 is to be tested for its empirical relevance, the time aspect 
has to be given more thorough consideration. The static model neglects the fact that there 
will always be a time-lag between the observations. A high utility expected from farming will 
not  only immediately lower the share of farms without a successor, as implied by the model. 
It will also increase the rate of school leavers that choose an agricultural training. After that 
choice has been made it will take some years for  the training  be it a practical apprenticeship 
or academic i.e. a university course, to be completed. Likewise, it is somewhat  unlikely that 
the takeover will take place immediately after the training  is finished. Usually, before 
succession, there will again be a gap  of some years during  which the successor will help on 
the farm or may take up a job elsewhere. This leads to the scheme explained  in Fig. 3: The 
trend of farm closure rates will follow the trend  of completed  agricultural training  with some 
time-lag, the trend  of completed  agricultural training  will follow the income situation in 
agriculture with another gap. While past studies as cited in Table 1 summarized these two 
interrelationships into one, in this study both interdependencies will be looked at separately. 
The interdependence between sectoral income and occupational choice can be thought of as 
a very conscious decision-making process, whereas the dependence between occupational 
















agricultural education ∆ number of farms










4.1 Occupational choice 
While there is some research on farm succession and its determinants, most authors fail to 
consider that the choice to follow an agricultural career will usually be separate from the 
succession of the family farm (Koch-Achelpöhler, 1998; Fasterding, 1999; Pesquin et al., 
1999). Knowledge about the actual determinants of occupational choice is rare. 
We try to explain occupational choices in Swiss agriculture between 1947 and 2001 by a 
regression. Beforehand, a few words about the patterns of occupational choice in Swiss 
agriculture may  be useful. After compulsory education, many persons who consider 
becoming a farmer  take a “Landwirtschaftliche Grundausbildung” (basic agricultural 
training). This three-year course consists of two years on-farm apprenticeship and one year 
at a  vocational school. After that, between 10 and 40 per cent of persons with a pass in a  
basic agricultural exam choose to enrol in a two-year course for the title of “Meisterlandwirt” 
(agricultural master diploma).  
While choosing the basic agricultural training course can be considered as a preliminary 
occupational choice at best, the diploma of agricultural master is usually taken  in order to 
prepare for farm takeover. Since a decision to study for the diploma  of  agricultural master 
has very much the character of occupational choice, we choose the annual number of 
agricultural master exams MAST as our dependent variable. The dependent variable was 
chosen in spite of the fact that 80 to 90 per cent of farm successors do not hold a master 
diploma. As it can be shown that the share of successions by masters from total successions   13
grows only slightly over the years, the number of agricultural master exams remains a good 
proxy for occupational choice. 
Table 2 summarises the variables used to explain the demand for agricultural training. One 
variable is taken from an occupational choice contribution by Drost (2002a). He shows that  
herd behaviour usually plays a role in occupational choice. While he shows that for a 
university subject the number of students choosing this subject is highly dependant on the 
numbers of students having done so before, we are going to test the transferability of this 
approach to non-academic careers like farming. We wish to test  if the number of people 
choosing an agricultural career is dependent on the number of people having done so  the 
year before (PEER). 
A explanation for occupational choices with a stronger relation to our hypothesis is the past 
economic development of the respective sector (Drost, 2002b), since  the past economic 
development strongly influences income expectations linked to  the respective type of career. 
In agriculture, the economic situation is narrowly mirrored by the average agricultural income 
of farms. As the choice to enrol in  the agricultural master course has to take place about 
three years before the exam is taken, the inflation-adjusted average agricultural net income 
from the fourth to the ninth year before the exam is used as an explaining variable INC. 
Compared, for example, with the agricultural gross income or the household income 
including off-farm sources, the net agricultural income of the farm seems to be the most 
relevant figure from which potential farm successors would be influenced in their decision. 
The data was taken from the central bookkeeping records of representative farms which 
have been held in Switzerland since the 19
th century. 
Table 2: Independent variables to explain MAST 
Variable Meaning 
PEER  Level of MAST in the previous year 
INC  Lagged agricultural income variable 
 
Summarising, we want to test whether 
log MAST = f (log PEER, log INC). 
A Durbin-Watson test confirmed the null hypothesis for autocorrelation, while the Breusch-
Pagan test showed the absence of heteroscedasticity. As the variables were normally 
distributed, OLS could be applied. 
Figure 4 shows the development of the inflation-adjusted agricultural income per farm 1943-
2001, the indexed number of persons taking the basic agricultural exam during the same   14




























































time, and – albeit not in the regression - the development of the number of farms. It can 
already be seen that, while farm numbers seem to decline steadily, the number of exams and 
the agricultural income seem to follow a similar pattern.  









Results of the regression are shown in Table 3. The number of persons studying for  an 
agricultural master diploma  is strongly determined by two factors. The first is the number of 
persons who have done so just before. This confirms the significance of herd behaviour, 
even with non-academic training. When people in your circle of acquaintances  choose to 
follow an agricultural career, it becomes more attractive to do so  yourself. 
The other significant factor is the agricultural income. It can clearly be confirmed that high 
sectoral income opportunities enhance the willingness to enter an advanced education in the 
respective sector. That means that the model in section 2.1 explaining occupational choice 
by rational expectations tied to an agricultural career, is to some degree linked to reality and 
our first hypothesis can be confirmed. 
Table 3: Explanatory Variables for MAST 




Intercept -7.2031 2.5891 0.0075 
PEER 0.5980  0.1281  0.0000 
INC 0.9667  0.3357  0.0058 
R
2 0.95 
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4.2 Structural change 
It is not the aim of this section to add another general model to explain the number of farms 
to the ones summarized in Table 1, but to specifically link the aspect of occupational choice 
to the changing numbers of farms. A finished education already involves considerable sunk 
costs, and only under special circumstances will an agricultural education not result in the 
succession on a farm. However, while it has proved relatively easy to trace back 
occupational choices to the economic situation of the sector, it will be far more difficult to 
statistically link the rate of decline in the number of farms to occupational choices. One of the 
two main reasons for that is the fact that more than one route may lead to a farming career: 
-  Particularly at the beginning of the time-series, in the mid-twentieth century, it has been 
very common to take over a farm without taking up any formal education. 
-  The role of  agricultural courses at higher education level has been changing too. While 
the number of university students of agriculture have followed similar patterns as the 
numbers of persons choosing the agricultural master diploma, the pathway of completing 
a three-year course at the Technical College of Agriculture in Central Switzerland as a 
preparation for farm takeover has been gaining in importance during recent  years. 
A second considerable difficulty in statistically tracing structural change back to past 
occupational choices is the time factor. There is a time-lag between completing  the 
agricultural master diploma and taking over a farm. The size and distribution of this time-lag 
is largely unknown  and will vary over the span of the time-series data. However, in 
Switzerland it is limited by the fact that one can only take a master diploma from the age of 
25 years onwards and that most farm successions happen in the early 30’s of the successor. 
What is more, the number of masters has to be set into relation to the number of farms, as 
300 masters per year in a country with 150,000 farms will lead to a different rate of structural 
change than 300 masters per year in a country with 75,000 farms. 
To link the number of master diplomas  to the rate of farm decline, a five-year average of 
master diplomas  taken in Switzerland between 1946 and 2001 divided by the number of 
farms (MAFA) is used as an explaining variable for the annual rate of farm decline dB/B in 
the subsequent year. While MAFA is thought to cover the labour availability for farming, the 
capital availability has to be taken into consideration by using the interest rate as another 
independent variable. It has already been shown (Everett and Watson, 1998) that the 
average level of interest rates (INT) is crucial for explaining structural development. To  
determine the time trend in addition to that, the year is used, so that it looks like this:  
∆F/F = f (log MAFA, INT, YEAR).   16
Again, OLS was chosen as a functional form as heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation could 
be excluded by the tests as described in Section 4.1. 
Table 4: Independent variables to explain ∆F/F 
Variable Meaning 
YEAR  Year (1943=0, 1944=1,...) 
MAFA  Passed Master diploma as a share of existing farms (lagged) 
INT  Average mortgage rate 
The results, as can be seen in Table 5, show a much lower coefficient of determination 
compared with that explaining occupational choice, due to the reasons stated above. There 
is a clear time trend that shows how structural change is apparently accelerating, while the 
significance of the interest rate could not be proven. The number of master diplomas as a 
proxy for occupational choice does apparently play a role in explaining structural change, so 
that the second hypothesis can be confirmed.  
Table 5: Explanatory variables for ∆F/F 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  Probability  Value 
Intercept 21.8388  11.1634  0.0564 
YEAR   -0.1878  0.0713  0.0114 
INT -0.3599  0.3771  0.3448 




5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Regarding structural change in family farm systems, the position of agricultural policy makers 
is usually ambivalent. On the one hand, increasing average farm size and therefore structural 
change is perceived as a precondition to exploit economies of scale and thus enhance 
sectoral efficiency. On the other hand, structural change can lead to social hardship which 
should  be avoided. In what range, then, should structural change take place and which, if 
any, are appropriate policy tools? 
The results of this paper points to an answer. It could be shown that one important source of 
structural change are ‘failed successions’, i.e. farms that are abandoned after the farmer’s 
retirement. If the income and other sources of utility in farming are low, none to few 
successions will happen, as young people prefer to choose an alternative career. This sort of 
structural change is unproblematic from a social point of view. If one assumes that the farmer   17
is in charge for a period of 30 years, this sort of structural change, however, is restricted to a 
maximum of about 3.3 per cent. 
Stronger structural change is, of course, possible. Under particularly unfavourable conditions 
for farming, it will become necessary for active farmers to shift into another sector. Given that 
they will have invested considerably in their agricultural training (on-farm and off-farm), this 
leads to  social hardship for the farmers and is also a waste of human resources. Hence, a 
rate of structural change above the rate with which farmers go into retirement should be 
avoided if possible. 
A second conclusion is to be drawn for agricultural policy. Countries like Australia or Canada 
are quite active in supporting young farmers. Countries which are not are often pushed 
toward young farmers’ support by pressure groups (Miguel, 2001). This is enhanced by the 
notion that school leavers in most family farm systems are currently very reluctant to choose 
an agricultural career. In Germany, 4930 agricultural apprenticeships have been offered to 
school leavers in 2002, but only 1380 were applied for (Kanowski, 2002). 55 per cent of 
European farmers are older than 55 years, indicating that in Europe we are to expect 
relevant structural change in the near future. It is, however, essential to recognise that with  
each graduate drawn into farming, the state reduces its leeway to allow for socially 
acceptable structural change. 
This view is, of course, only true for family farm systems as we find in most parts of the 
western world. For transformation countries, structural change in recent years has usually 
meant that a new class of family farms was up and coming. In bipolar agricultural systems 
with large corporate farms on the one hand and small(er) family farms on the other, the 
dynamics between occupational choice and structural change still have to be discovered. 
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